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SUPPLEMENT 2

TO

JOINT EVALUATION OF
SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
**National Photographic Interpretation Center**

2200 HOURS

21 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101
15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103
17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106, 3107, 3108, & 3109
18 October 1962 Mission 3111
19 October 1962 Mission 3113

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NOTICE

This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.

DEFINITIONS

An Emergency Operational Capability exists when a site could launch some missiles should a decision be made to do so.

A Full Operational Capability is achieved when a site has reached a steady state of readiness with the ability to salvo its first missile load within about 6 to 8 hours and with the ability to refire within 4 to 6 hours.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The comparative photographic coverage indicates that, while an emergency operational capability could exist at several offensive missile sites, the Soviet objective in Cuba is to attain full operational capability at all sites as soon as possible, rather than to prepare each site for an emergency launch capability as soon as the missiles and equipment arrive in the area. (See Figure 1.) ·

2. There are clear indications that at least five Soviet offensive missile regiments, each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles, will become operational in Cuba. (See Table 1.) This will represent a first salvo potential of 40 missiles with a refire capability of an additional 40 missiles. It should be noted that this threat against the U.S. is approximately one-half the currently estimated ICBM missile threat from the USSR.

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